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ARTICLES
ORIGINAL INTENT: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN 
CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 
Kristin A. Linsley* 
I. INTRODUCTION
At a time in which the closely watched cases reaching the 
Supreme Court tend to involve novel issues under the Bill of 
Rights or important federal statutory questions that have 
produced conflicts in the lower courts, one important category of 
cases on the Court’s docket often goes unnoticed: those 
involving the Court’s original jurisdiction over disputes between 
States. Original jurisdiction at the Supreme Court is somewhat 
of an oddity, in that the Court must act as both the trial court and 
the court of last resort in deciding these matters—an unusual 
posture for a Court that rarely resolves discovery disputes, takes 
live testimony, or makes original findings of fact. But the unique 
structure of our federalist form of government—with 
*The author is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. While at a different firm, she 
served as a Special Master in South Carolina v. North Carolina, Original No. 138, a 
dispute between the two States over the allocation of the waters of the Catawba River. The 
author thanks Lindsey Sugimoto for her helpful research and input in the preparation of 
this article.  
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subordinate sovereigns losing some aspects of their separate 
sovereignty upon joining the union but retaining others—called 
for a unique judicial structure in which disputes between these 
subordinate sovereigns could be resolved in a way that avoided 
the partisan state court systems and accorded the States the 
dignity to which their sovereign status entitled them. 
Although Article III also created other bases for the Court’s 
original jurisdiction, this article focuses on disputes between 
States, which from the inception have been the mainstay of the 
Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence, and have represented 
the strain of Article III power consistently reserved for exclusive 
resolution by the Court. Several features of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction distinguish it from the Court’s “appellate” docket—
a term that is used broadly to describe its review of cases 
originating in the lower federal courts or the state courts, and 
that includes both the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction and, in 
earlier years, appeals as of right in certain categories of cases. 
First, the history of, and rationale for, the Court’s original 
jurisdiction are central to the manner in which the Court has 
defined the contours of the jurisdiction. Part II of this article 
explores the background of the grant of original jurisdiction in 
Article III, the manner in which that grant has been construed 
and defined in disputes between States, and the early history of 
the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction. As this history 
shows, the Court consistently has given great weight to the 
historical and structural rationale for its original jurisdiction in 
determining how that jurisdictional grant should be exercised 
and applied. 
Second, in part because of this historical and structural 
context, the Court’s original jurisdiction has produced very 
different issues and rules than has its ordinary appellate docket. 
Because the very nature of original jurisdiction requires the 
Court to act as a trial court and as a court of last resort, the rules 
for such cases are very different from either type of jurisdiction 
standing alone. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, are said to serve as 
“guides,”1 but the Court is not bound to follow them, and a State 
1. Sup. Ct. R. 17(2) (providing also that “[t]he form of pleadings and motions 
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is followed” in original actions). 
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION—CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 23
seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction must seek the Court’s 
leave to do so.2 Further, the intensely time-consuming 
responsibilities of the trial court role create the potential that 
original jurisdiction cases could occupy an inordinate portion of 
the Court’s limited resources, and could involve the Court in 
managing petty disputes between the States or their constituents. 
For precisely these reasons, the Court has guarded its original 
jurisdiction carefully, reserving the “delicate and grave”3
exercise of that jurisdiction for the narrow class of disputes that 
truly implicate the concerns that necessitated the constitutional 
grant. And to address the practical concerns, the Court 
frequently appoints Special Masters to assist with these cases.4
Part III discusses some of these unique issues and practical 
concerns and the manner in which the Court has addressed them. 
II. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE COURT’S
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states that the 
“judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”5 Article III, Section 2, 
itemizes the specific categories of cases to which the “judicial 
Power” shall extend, including “Controversies between two or 
more States,” and goes on to state that “[i]n all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme court shall have 
original jurisdiction.”6
2. Sup. Ct. R. 17(3) (providing that “[t]he initial pleading shall be preceded by a motion 
for leave to file”). 
3. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900) (refusing to exercise original jurisdiction because 
the case was not in substance a controversy between states: original jurisdiction should be 
exercised only when “the necessity [i]s absolute and the matter in itself properly 
justiciable”); see also S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. 256, 267 (2010) (indicating that the Court will 
exercise its original jurisdiction “sparingly” and will “retain substantial discretion to decide 
whether a particular claim requires an original forum” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
4. See, e.g., S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 259 (noting that case had first been referred to a 
special master). 
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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A. Nature of Original Jurisdiction 
The term “original” jurisdiction is distinguished from 
“appellate” jurisdiction. It means that the Court has “the power 
to hear and decide a lawsuit in the first instance”—in other 
words, to act as a trial court—whereas “appellate” denotes the 
power “to review the judgment of another court that has already 
heard the lawsuit in the first instance.”7 The distinction between 
“original” and “appellate” jurisdiction was a settled feature of 
English law at the time the Constitution was adopted.8 William 
Blackstone used the term “original jurisdiction” to describe the 
role of the king to resolve disputes between American provinces 
over the “extent of their charters” or similar matters: “Whenever 
also a question arises between two provinces in America, or 
elsewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like, 
the king in his council exercises original jurisdiction therein, 
upon the principles of [feudal] sovereignty.”9 Although of 
course this type of original jurisdiction would not be the same as 
that exercised by the Court under Article III—given that the 
king, as the source of the charters that created certain rights 
(including boundaries) for American provinces before the 
Revolution, naturally would have been called upon to interpret 
those charters so long as England controlled the colonies—the 
reference nonetheless would have provided a model for similar 
resolution by a Supreme Court, particularly given that some 
royal charters continued to be relevant to such matters as 
boundaries even after the Constitution was ratified.10
7. WILLIAM. H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 31 (2001); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 551 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (asserting that 
“the expressions ‘appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact,’ do not necessarily imply a 
re-examination in the supreme court of facts decided by juries in the inferior courts”). 
8. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *231 (1809) (indicating that the 
privy council acted as a “court of appeal” in some cases, and that appeal to the king himself 
was also possible).  
9. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Wis. v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888), 
overruled in part by Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
10. Even the current borders between some of the states continue to be guided by royal 
charters, except that now these charters are interpreted by the Supreme Court instead of the 
crown. See, e.g., Ga. v. S.C., 497 U.S. 376, 380–81 (1990) (noting that the boundary 
between the two states, originally defined in 1732 by letters patent issued by the crown, 
was clarified in the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort, which continues to define the boundary).  
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION—CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 25
The original jurisdiction bestowed on the Supreme Court 
was indeed of a different character than that exercised by the 
crown, and was crucial to the Constitutional design. At the time 
the Constitution was ratified, and under the Articles of 
Confederation, each state was sovereign in its own right, subject 
only to powers “expressly delegated” to Congress.11 The 
Articles did not provide for any federal judiciary or for a 
Supreme Court,12 and any disputes between states over 
“boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever” were to be 
resolved by Congress, which was directed to convene a court to 
resolve such disputes under its auspices.13
Early drafts of Article III of the Constitution would have 
vested all original jurisdiction in state courts,14 but the framers 
quickly came to the view that state court jurisdiction would not 
be satisfactory for certain important categories of cases—either 
because state courts might entertain biases in favor of their own 
citizens or local governments, or because certain disputes might 
implicate national interests at the highest level. After several 
rounds of drafts, the final version of Article III conferred 
original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over disputes 
between States and other important categories of cases.15
11. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. II (1877) (“Each State retains its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”); see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) at 130 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) at 143 (J.E. Cook ed., 1961) 
(complaining of “[a] circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation . . . the 
want of a judiciary power”).  
13. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. IX (1877) (“The United States in Congress 
assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now 
subsisting, or that hereafter may arise, between two or more states concerning boundary, 
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.”). The Articles also provided for procedures by 
which such disputes would be presented to and resolved by Congress. Id.; see generally 
Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1901) (quoting Articles of Confederation).
14. J.E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party 
Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 620 (1994) (tracing the “progression of the drafts, from one 
that vested all original jurisdiction in state courts to one that conferred original jurisdiction 
directly upon the Court,” and concluding that “the grant was predicated on distrust of state 
courts and a preference for original cognizance in the federal courts”). 
15. Id.; see also Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. at 221–24 (following language through proposals 
and drafts). 
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B. Rationale Behind Original Jurisdiction for State Disputes 
The context of the States’ entry into the United States 
makes clear why the Court’s original jurisdiction was so crucial. 
Before the formation of the federal union, the states were 
separate sovereigns, and, as such, had at least the theoretical 
ability to resolve disputes among themselves by war or 
negotiation.16 When the states ratified the Constitution and 
thereby joined the Union, they expressly relinquished these 
customary international law means for settling disagreements 
among sovereigns. Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution 
states that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation,” and that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent 
of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another State, . . . or engage in War.”17 By agreeing to these 
restrictions, the States gave up a significant part of their ability 
to resolve any differences that might arise between them, and it 
was essential that the Constitution provide them an alternative 
means of resolving disputes that would not require the use of the 
courts of one of the involved states—because, as Alexander 
Hamilton explained, “no man ought certainly to be a judge in his 
own cause”18—and that would properly recognize the dignity 
and sovereignty of each involved State. As Hamilton further 
noted, it would “ill suit [the] dignity [of the states] to be turned 
over to an inferior tribunal.”19
For this reason, it was essential to the States and to the 
preservation of the Union that a mechanism be provided to 
resolve disputes that already existed, and inevitably would arise 
in the future, between and among the States. As the Court 
recounted in United States v. Texas,20 at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, there already were controversies 
between eleven states as to their boundaries, which disputes 
“had continued from the first settlement of the colonies,” and it 
was deemed essential to have a national tribunal “for the 
16. See, e.g., Ga. v. Penn. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) at 538 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 7, at 548. 
20. 143 U.S. 621 (1862). 
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION—CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 27
settlement of these and like controversies that might arise.”21
Article III delegated this role to the Supreme Court, as a 
superior, national tribunal to “match the dignity of the parties to 
the status of the court.”22 As the Court explained in Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, a complaining state, 
[b]ound hand and foot by the prohibitions of the 
[C]onstitution . . . can neither treat, agree, or fight with its 
adversary, without the consent of [C]ongress: a resort to the 
judicial power is the only means left for legally adjusting, 
or persuading a state which has possession of disputed 
territory, to enter into an agreement or compact, relating to 
a controverted boundary.23
Article III established the Supreme Court as the impartial forum 
for the States, to accord them the dignity of sovereigns and serve 
as a “substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies 
between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”24 By 
consenting to the Constitution, the States agreed to this method 
of resolving any disputes between them, and thereby gave up 
part of their sovereign right to be immune from suit.25
21. Id. at 625; see also R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723–24 (1838) (describing 
nature of disputes).  
22. Cal. v. Ariz., 440 U.S. 59, 65–66 (1979). Professor Pfander advocates the view that 
the true purpose of the original jurisdiction clause of Article III was not to provide a 
dignified forum, but rather to ensure that federal law would be enforced against the States. 
Pfander, supra n. 14, at 558. Professor Amar advocates an alternative view—that the 
Court’s original jurisdiction was largely driven by a desire to establish a geographically 
convenient and neutral forum for States and foreign diplomats. Akhil Reed Amar, 
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 443 469–78, 489–90 (1989). A full analysis of these competing views is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
23. R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 726 (noting that “[f]ew, if any, will be made, when it is left 
to the pleasure of the state in possession; but when it is known that some tribunal can 
decide on the right, it is most probable that controversies will be settled by compact”).
24. Kan. v. Neb., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015) (recognizing “inherent 
authority, as part of the Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion 
interstate streams between States,” and exercising original jurisdiction in action seeking to 
allow Nebraska to appropriate more water than interstate compact originally allowed). 
25. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 720–21.
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C. Congress’s Power with Respect to the Court’s 
Original Jurisdiction 
The text of Article III significantly curtails the power of 
Congress to limit or expand the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
Article III, Section 2, states that the Court “shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”26 This last 
clause has long been read to allow Congress to limit and 
otherwise define the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.27 Yet no such 
caveat qualifies the grant of original jurisdiction, which states 
broadly that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a 
Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”28
Based on this clear textual distinction between the two heads of 
the Court’s jurisdiction, it has long been held that the original 
jurisdiction is “self-executing and unassailable by Congress”29—
in the sense that “in all cases where original jurisdiction is given 
by the Constitution,” the Supreme Court “has authority to 
exercise it without any further act of Congress to . . . 
confer jurisdiction.”30
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
27.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 7, at 552; The Francis Wright, 105 
U.S. 381, 386 (1881); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1869). The extent of 
Congress’s power to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction on specific subject matters has 
been the subject of some academic debate, see generally Julian Velasco, Congressional 
Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 Cath. U. 
L. Rev. 671 (1997), but that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
29. Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special 
Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 632
(2002) (citing Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); see also Cal. v. Ariz., 440 
U.S. at 65 (indicating that Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is effective automatically 
without legislative authority); Fla. v. Ga., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492 (1854) (stating that 
“the omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the court of the jurisdiction 
conferred . . . and in the absence of any legislation by congress, the court itself was 
authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding, so as to accomplish the ends for 
which the jurisdiction was given”).  
30. Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861), overruled on other grounds by
P.R. v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 230 (1987) (declaring that “Kentucky v. Dennison is the 
product of another time” and “may stand no longer”). 
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The seminal case of Marbury v. Madison31 was the first to 
enforce this understanding by holding unconstitutional a part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 that purported to grant the Supreme 
Court the power to issue writs of mandamus. After concluding 
that the issuance of such a writ necessarily would be an act of 
“original”—and not “appellate”—jurisdiction, Justice Marshall 
declared that Congress could not constitutionally grant such 
power, as the mandamus power was not among those 
enumerated in Article III as part of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.32 And because Marbury was neither an ambassador 
nor a State, he was not entitled to invoke the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.33 The Court found that this aspect of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution and was therefore 
unconstitutional—famously establishing for the first time the 
Court’s power to strike down an act of Congress as inconsistent 
with the Constitution.34
Although the Court repeatedly has stated that Congress 
may not limit or expand the Court’s original jurisdiction, it long 
has been understood that Congress may make certain aspects of 
the Court’s original jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state 
or lower federal courts—a point not directly addressed by the 
text of Article III.35 Congress enacted this understanding in the 
first Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that the Court would 
have exclusive and original jurisdiction over “all controversies 
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
32. Id. at 174 (“If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, 
where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original 
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of 
jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.”).  
33. Id.
34. Id. at 189 (“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, 
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
35. See, e.g., Ames v. Kan., 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884) (acknowledging that Court is 
“unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of 
the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the 
constitution with original jurisdiction.”). A frequently noted dictum in Marbury, 5 U.S. at 
174, could be read to suggest that the Court’s original jurisdiction in its entirety was 
exclusive of the states, but that has never been the understanding adopted by Congress or 
later decisions of the Court. See generally Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. 
Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 242–44 (2d ed. 1973).
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of a civil nature, where a state is a party” and over any actions or 
proceedings against ambassadors or foreign officials36—and
original but nonexclusive jurisdiction over controversies 
between a state and citizens of another state or actions brought 
by ambassadors or foreign officials.37 The current version of this 
provision further narrows the cases as to which the Court’s 
original jurisdiction shall be “exclusive,” limiting that class to 
“all controversies between two or more states.”38 In 1884, the 
Court held that the then-extant provisions for nonexclusive 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court were consistent with the text 
of Article III—which the Court found was meant to reserve the 
Court’s original jurisdiction for matters carrying a high level of 
importance, not to require it to hear “a petty claim of even less 
than five dollars” merely because the defendant “had been 
clothed by some foreign government with the consular office,”39
or to require a State or an ambassador to present any and all 
grievances in “this one tribunal.”40 Congress’s consistent 
provision for concurrent original jurisdiction over broad 
categories of subjects identified in Article III as part of the 
Court’s original jurisdiction has significantly narrowed the range 
of matters over which the Court finds it appropriate to exercise 
that jurisdiction. 
Consistent with the nonexclusive nature of certain heads of 
the Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court has imposed its own 
limitations on the scope of that jurisdiction. Although the literal 
text of Article III would appear to authorize original jurisdiction 
over criminal cases—because a State is almost always a party to 
such cases—and although Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 
provided for nonexclusive original jurisdiction over civil 
controversies between a State and citizens of other States,41 the 
Court made clear in early cases that it had no power to entertain 
an action by a State to enforce its own penal statutes, even 
36. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, § 13 (Sept. 
24, 1789) [hereinafter 1789 Act].  
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
39. Bऺrs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 260 (1884). 
40. Ames, 111 U.S. at 464. 
41. 1789 Act, supra note 36, at 73, § 13. 
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION—CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 31
where the State sought some form of civil penalty.42 The Court 
cited the longstanding rule, grounded in English precedents and 
in international law, that a sovereign cannot enforce the penal 
statutes of another sovereign.43
The Court also has clarified other aspects of original 
jurisdiction, particularly as it relates to the relationships of the 
parties. The Court has held that it has original, nonexclusive 
jurisdiction over cases between a State and the United States,44
but that the original jurisdiction does not extend to cases 
between States and federal agencies.45 Congress has codified 
these holdings by providing that the Supreme Court has original 
but not exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between the 
United States and a State, actions by a State against the citizens 
of another State, and proceedings involving ambassadors or 
foreign consuls.46
III. ORIGINAL ACTIONS BETWEEN STATES
One aspect of the Court’s original jurisdiction that has been 
a constant over the years is its role of deciding “Controversies 
between two or more States”47—an aspect of the Court’s 
original jurisdiction that both the Court and Congress have 
consistently deemed exclusive of other courts. The Court has 
read the text of Article III to require exclusive jurisdiction over 
42. See, e.g., Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 290–94 (discussing early precedents). 
43. Id. at 289–91 (surveying authorities, among them The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), in which Chief Justice Marshall famously declared that “the courts 
of no country execute the penal laws of another”); see also Ga. v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 
446 (1945) (recognizing that original jurisdiction does not allow States to bring claims for 
the enforcement of State penal statutes). 
44. See, e.g., U.S. v. La., 339 U.S. 699, 700 (1950) (recognizing the rights of the United 
States against Louisiana for property along the State’s coast); U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621, 
643–46 (1892) (reasoning that the presence of a State in the dispute supports original 
jurisdiction and that the presence of the United States creates federal judicial power). 
45. See, e.g., Tex. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (refusing 
to exercise original jurisdiction over a claim by a State against two federal agencies 
because the defendants were not “citizens of any state, but ha[d] the same relation to one 
state as to another”).  
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b). 
47.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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disputes between two or more States,48 and Congress—from the 
first Judiciary Act to the present—has never tested the question 
by providing for anything other than exclusive jurisdiction over 
such cases, as reflected in the current codification of the rule.49
The exclusivity of the constitutional grant was closely bound up 
with the Court’s conclusion—reached early in its original 
jurisdiction jurisprudence—that States did not enjoy sovereign 
immunity from the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction 
over controversies with other States.50 The Court held that, in 
light of the history and rationale underlying the original 
jurisdiction clause, the States implicitly waived the relevant 
aspects of their sovereign immunity when they ratified the 
Constitution and agreed to the dispute resolution mechanism 
provided by Article III.51
A. Early Cases: Boundary Controversies Between States 
Over the years, disputes between States have represented 
the vast majority of the Court’s original jurisdiction cases, and 
also likely would be viewed as the most important. But even so, 
the numbers are small: by the 1990s, the Court had entertained 
and decided only about 170 original jurisdiction cases.52 Many 
of the earliest such cases—including the first reported original 
jurisdiction case, New York v. Connecticut—involved property 
disputes or controversies over interstate boundaries.53 The two 
48. See, e.g., La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900) (“[B]y the Constitution and according 
to the statute, the original jurisdiction of this court is exclusive over suits between states, 
though not exclusive over those between a state and citizens of another state.”). 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see also Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. 73, 76–78 (1992) (discussing 
early cases and concluding that “the description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ 
necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court”); Cal. v. Ariz., 440 
U.S. at 63 (noting that “a district court could not hear [California’s] claims against Arizona, 
because this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims”).
50. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 720–21.
51. Id.
52. See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. REV. 665 (1959) (indicating that 123 cases had been decided by 1959, 
discussing relevant law, and providing list of cases) [hereinafter Stanford Note]. Based on 
the Court’s docket and numbering system, the author estimates that about forty-seven 
additional cases have been filed since the count reported in the Stanford Note.
53. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 (1799); see also Mo. v. Ky., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 395 (1870); Va. 
v. W. Va., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (1870); Ala. v. Ga., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1860); Fla. v. 
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States in that first case had entered into an agreement granting 
certain lands to New York,54 but Connecticut then conveyed the 
same land to private individuals and obtained an injunction in its 
own courts to enforce the grant.55 The case thus involved not the 
boundary between States, but “the right of soil, which . . . results 
from the right of jurisdiction.”56 The Supreme Court refused to 
uphold the injunction, holding that New York’s absence in the 
prior state court proceeding deprived it of a fair adjudication.57
As the Court observed in 1888, the “most numerous class” 
of original cases entertained by the Court consisted of
controversies between two states as to the boundaries of 
their territory, such as were determined before the 
Revolution by the king in council, and under the Articles of 
Confederation (while there was no national judiciary) by 
committees or commissioners appointed by congress.58
Indeed, the Court noted that “[t]he books of reports contain but 
few other cases in which the aid of this court has been invoked 
in controversies between two states.”59
Ga., 58 U.S. 478; Mo. v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660 (1849); R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. 657; 
N.J. v. N.Y., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1831). 
54. N.Y. v. Conn., 4 U.S. at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 6 (explaining that, “as the State of New York was not a party to the suits 
below, nor interested in the decision of those suits, an injunction ought not to issue”).
58. Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 288.
59. Id. (citations omitted); see also La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 18 (noting that, “[a]s might 
be expected in view of the nature of the jurisdiction, the cases are few in which the aid of 
the court has been sought in ‘controversies between two or more States,’” and also 
recognizing that they were “chiefly controversies as to boundaries” (citing Pelican
Insurance)). In addition to addressing boundaries, a handful of early interstate cases 
addressed the payment of bonds and the enforcement of quarantine regulations. See, e.g.,
S.D. v. N.C., 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (enforcing North Carolina’s obligation to pay on 
bonds to South Dakota); La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 22–23 (dismissing for lack of original 
jurisdiction because the facts did not support the claim that one State authorized its health 
officer to issue a quarantine that “place[d] an embargo in fact on all interstate commerce 
between the state of Louisiana and the state of Texas”); N.H. v. La., 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) 
(denying original jurisdiction on New Hampshire’s claims for debts on behalf of private 
individuals against Louisiana). 
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B. Expansion of Court’s Jurisdiction Beyond Boundary Cases 
It is not surprising that most of the Court’s early disputes 
between states addressed boundary disputes and related issues. 
Not only were there a large number of such disputes brewing at 
the time the Constitution was adopted,60 but there existed early 
in the Court’s jurisprudence a strong view that a State’s right to 
invoke the Court’s jurisdiction did not extend to suits in which 
the State sought to vindicate the rights of its citizens—that is, to 
act as parens patriae61—but rather encompassed only cases in 
which the State asserted rights affecting “the property or the 
powers of the complaining state in its sovereign or corporate 
capacity.”62 Of course, boundary disputes were of precisely such 
a proprietary character, so it is not surprising that no question 
was raised but that such disputes fell squarely within the 
jurisdictional grant.63 It was only in 1900 that the Court first 
suggested, in Louisiana v. Texas, that the jurisdiction might 
permit a State to represent the interests of its citizens in a parens
patriae capacity.64 The Court firmly embraced that conclusion 
60. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621 (1892). 
61. Literally, “parent of the country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979) 
(defining parens patriae as “a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign 
interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general 
economy of the state,” and the like).
62. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“When the Constitution gave 
this court jurisdiction of controversies between states, it did not thereby authorize a state to 
bring another state to the bar of this court for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of 
local statutes or regulations that do not affect the property or the powers of the complaining 
state in its sovereign or corporate capacity, but which at most affect only the rights of 
individual citizens or corporations engaged in interstate commerce.”). 
63. U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. at 640 (“[T]hat a controversy between two or more states, in 
respect to boundary, is one to which, under the constitution, such judicial power extends, is 
no longer an open question in this court.”).  
64. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 19 (recognizing that Louisiana believed itself “entitled to 
seek relief in this way because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large,” but 
also recognizing that “if the case stated is not one presenting a controversy between these 
states, the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court as against the state of Texas cannot 
be maintained”). The Court ultimately did not pass on Louisiana’s claimed right to proceed 
in a parens patriae capacity, finding that the action did not involve a justiciable dispute 
between the States. Id. at 22–23 (asserting that “this bill does not set up facts which show 
that the state of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged action of her health 
officer as to make it her own, or from which it necessarily follows that the two states are in 
controversy within the meaning of the Constitution”). In earlier cases, the Court had 
declined to decide whether a complaining State had to assert its own proprietary interests, 
rather than more general sovereign interests or the interests of its citizens. In South 
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the following year in Missouri v. Illinois.65 Missouri filed that 
action against Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of 
Chicago, complaining that Chicago was disposing of waste that 
was finding its way down the Mississippi River, to the detriment 
of citizens of Missouri who owned property along the river. The 
Court rejected the contention that the action was not within the 
cognizance of the Court’s original jurisdiction, holding that “if 
the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state are 
threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and defend 
them.”66 This was a significant expansion of the powers that the 
Court previously had exercised—such as in boundary and 
property disputes—where the States’ own proprietary interests 
were at stake. And by permitting the State of Missouri to 
proceed with its action, the Court entertained its first interstate 
pollution abatement case.67
C. Court’s Discretion to Decline Original Jurisdiction 
As the Court began to expand the class of cases that it 
deemed properly within its original jurisdiction, an important 
question arose as to whether Court had discretion to decline
jurisdiction over a matter that otherwise qualified for original 
jurisdiction under Article III and the governing statute. Not 
surprisingly, given the burden on the Court’s docket that might 
otherwise have resulted, the Court’s answer to that question was 
yes—even in cases, such as controversies between States, in 
which its jurisdiction was deemed exclusive of the state or lower 
federal courts. In 1900, the Court explained in Louisiana v. 
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 4 (1876), South Carolina sought to enjoin Georgia, the 
Secretary of War, and others, from “obstructing or interrupting” the navigation of the 
Savannah River. In dismissing the bill for want of any showing of an unlawful obstruction, 
the Court reserved the question whether a State, in asserting such a claim, must “aver and 
show that it will sustain some special and peculiar injury therefrom, and such as would 
enable a private person to maintain a similar action in another court.” Id. at 14. In 
Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1877), the Court did not address the contention that it 
could “take cognizance of no question which concerns alone the rights of a State in her 
political or sovereign character; that to sustain the suit she must have some proprietary 
interest which is affected by the defendant.” Id. at 382. 
65. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
66. Id. at 241.  
67.  The subsequent proceedings, reported in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), 
are discussed below.  
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Texas that the original jurisdiction “is of so delicate and grave a 
character that it was not contemplated that it would be exercised 
save when the necessity was absolute.”68 The Court consistently 
has repeated that its original jurisdiction should be exercised 
only “sparingly,”69 and has interpreted both Article III and the 
operative statute as according the Court “substantial discretion 
to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of 
an original forum in this Court,”70 and making original 
jurisdiction “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”71
The Court initially exercised its discretion not to accept 
original jurisdiction in the context of actions falling within its 
nonexclusive original jurisdiction, such as actions by States 
against citizens of other States, and actions between the United 
States and a State.72 Later, the Court made clear that the same 
discretion allowed it to decline jurisdiction even over disputes 
between States, in which its original jurisdiction always has 
been deemed exclusive.73 The Court has said that its 
determination as to whether a case is “appropriate” for original 
jurisdiction will be guided by two factors74—both of which 
follow directly from the historical rationale for the jurisdiction. 
First, the Court looks to “the nature of the interest of the 
complaining State,”75 with a focus on the “seriousness and 
dignity of the claim,”76 As the Court has explained, “‘[t]he 
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is 
a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would 
amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.’”77 The 
Court also will consider whether an alternative forum is 
available in which the controversy can be resolved—a factor 
68.  La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 15.
69.  See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76 (1992); Wyo. v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 450 (1992); 
Md. v. La., 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981); Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. 794, 796 (1976).  
70.  Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).
71.  Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
72.  See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 77 (citing Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 
493 (1971), and U.S. v. Nev., 412 U.S. 534 (1973)). 
73.  See id. at 77 (citing Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. 794 (1976), Cal. v. W. Va., 454 U.S. 
1027 (1981), and Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554 (1983)).  
74.  See id. at 77 (1992) (describing factors).
75.  Id. (quoting Mass. v. Mo., 308 U.S. 1, 18 (1939)).
76.  Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93). 
77. Id. (quoting Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554, 571, n.18. (1983)).  
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that, although relevant, will not always be dispositive.78 Both 
factors draw upon the historic and structural need for a forum in 
which States can resolve their most serious disputes. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT’S LAWMAKING POWER
Another important question that arose as the variety of 
cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction docket expanded 
was whether the Court had the power to make affirmative law in 
the course of exercising its original jurisdiction, or whether it 
was limited to applying existing state or federal law. This was 
not an issue that typically arose in boundary cases, which 
generally were governed by a formal document, such as a grant 
from the crown or a prior treaty between States, such that the 
Court’s principal role was to interpret the document.79
As the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction expanded into areas 
not governed by a treaty or some other external source, some 
parties argued that Article III was merely a jurisdictional grant 
that gave the Court the power to entertain a case, and that the 
power to make law to provide a rule of decision was reserved to 
Congress—so that if no such law existed to resolve the matter, 
the Court was powerless to act.80 The Court ultimately 
disagreed, holding in Kansas v. Colorado81 that the Court’s 
crucial constitutional role of resolving disputes between States 
necessarily meant that the Court may have to fashion “interstate 
common law” to reach a resolution, in the absence of other 
controlling law: 
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states 
to each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands 
78. Id. (citing City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93). In Arizona v. New Mexico, the Court 
declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, concluding that a pending state court action 
“provide[d] an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered . . . may be litigated.” Ariz.
v. N.M., 425 U.S. at 797.
79. See, e.g., Ga. v. S.C., 257 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1922) (resolving boundary issues 
between Georgia and South Carolina by reference to the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort); Ga. v. 
S.C., 497 U.S. 376, 380–81 (1990) (finally resolving State boundary by reference to the 
same 1787 Treaty, which succeeded 1732 letters patent chartering colony of Georgia). 
80. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 677, 717–18 (reproducing both argument by 
counsel that Congress has the sole power to make federal law to govern such disputes and 
Court’s acknowledgement of State’s argument).
81. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).  
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on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own 
legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its 
own views to none. Yet, whenever . . . the action of one 
state reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into the 
territory of another state, the question of the extent and the 
limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter 
of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called 
upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize 
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish 
justice between them. In other words, through these 
successive disputes and decisions this court is practically 
building up what may not improperly be called interstate 
common law.”82
The Court went so far as to state that its power to fashion federal 
common law in this area, being a critical part of its 
constitutional power and duty to resolve controversies between 
States, extended beyond the limited powers of Congress as 
enumerated in Article I.83
It was based on this set of understandings that the Court 
began to develop federal common law in one of its most 
complex areas of original jurisdiction—that of equitable 
apportionment of the waters of an interstate river or waterway.    
Although these cases were of enormous importance to the States 
involved, and concerned complex issues requiring resolution, 
the precedent available to the Court was extremely limited. 
Indeed, because there is little existing federal law or other 
guidance to resolve water-apportionment matters, and because 
by the very nature and purpose of original jurisdiction no one 
State’s rules can prevail over another’s, this area perhaps 
represents the most expansive manifestation of the Court’s 
federal common law powers within the scope of its original 
jurisdiction. 
From the beginning, the Court made clear that its 
jurisdiction to determine the extent of one State’s rights to the 
waters of a river over those of another State is very broad.84 In 
82. Id. at 97–98 (citation omitted). 
83. Id. at 95 (“It does not follow . . . that because Congress cannot determine the rule 
which shall control between the two states . . . the controversy ceases to be one of a 
justiciable nature.”). 
84. See generally Kristin Linsley Myles, South Carolina v. North Carolina: Some
Problems Arising in an East Coast Water Dispute, 12 WYO. L. REV. 3 (2012).
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Kansas v. Colorado,85 one of the earliest such cases to reach the 
Court, Kansas challenged Colorado’s diversion of waters of the 
Arkansas River to irrigate non-riparian arid lands, and claimed 
that under English common law, Kansas was entitled to receive 
the flows of the river as they existed “before any human 
interference.”86 Colorado, for its part, claimed the right of its 
users under its doctrine of prior appropriation to take the entire 
flow of the stream, arguing that it had a sovereign right to divert 
and use any and all water running through its boundaries, 
without regard to any downstream impact on Kansas.87 The 
Court rejected both positions, holding that the dispute would be 
resolved “upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as far 
as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without 
depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing 
stream.”88
The Court’s solution in Kansas v. Colorado neatly captured 
the unique constitutional design of the original jurisdiction 
clause to ensure that each State is treated with dignity. This 
concern also drove the Court’s determination that federal 
common law, and not the underlying law of either state, 
ultimately would govern the dispute. A significant factor that 
affected the Court’s analysis was that the two States applied 
different—and inconsistent—state law schemes for allocating 
private rights from the waters of a river. The Court noted that 
“[i]f the two states were absolutely independent nations,” the 
dispute “would be settled by treaty or by force,” but because 
neither of these methods was possible, the dispute “must be 
settled by decision of this court.”89 The resulting inquiry for 
resolving such water-apportionment matters, best summarized in 
Nebraska v. Wyoming,90 is very broad: 
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But 
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of 
85. 206 U.S. 46.
86. Id. at 85, 98 (stating, and then expounding upon, common law rule).
87. Id. at 98 (characterizing Colorado’s argument as “extreme” and pointing out that 
“the appropriation of the entire flow of the river would naturally tend to make the lands 
along the stream in Kansas less arable[,] . . . taking from the adjacent territory that which 
had been the customary natural means of preserving its arable character”).
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. at 98.
90. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
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water in the several sections of the river, the character and 
rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the 
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful 
uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as 
compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a 
limitation is imposed on the former—these are all relevant 
factors. They are merely an illustrative not an exhaustive 
catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of 
apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests 
which must be made.91
Although the Court has made clear that it is making federal 
common law in resolving such disputes,92 it looks to numerous 
sources as a means of resolving interstate disputes, in an effort 
to “recognize the equal rights of both [States] and at the same 
time establish justice between them.”93 In Kansas v. Colorado,
the Court held that, depending on the particular case, the Court 
considers “[f]ederal law, state law, and international law.”94 As 
for international law, although one would expect this to be a 
highly valuable source for resolving disputes between States—
which, after all, remain sovereign entities to some degree—the 
Court does not resort to such materials as frequently as one 
would expect, and generally frames any such references as 
simply informing the creation of federal common law.95
More prominently, the Court frequently (but not always) 
considers applicable state law in developing a federal common 
91. Id. at 618; accord Colo. v. Kan., 320 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1944) (discussing benefits 
flowing from increased use of disputed water source, harms likely to result from its 
withdrawal, and corresponding harms potentially to be suffered by downstream State, and 
also noting that “great and serious caution” is “necessary” when endeavoring to determine 
whether each State’s case is proved). This equitable appropriation approach remains the 
governing doctrine for “resolving high disputes between sovereigns” by ensuring fair and 
evenhanded water divisions. Joshua Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the Equitable 
Apportionment of Interstate Waterways, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 43 (2014) (quoting S.C. v. 
N.C., 558 U.S. 256, 277 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)) (footnote omitted)). 
92. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable apportionment is the doctrine 
of federal common law that governs disputes between states concerning their rights to use 
the water of an interstate stream.”).  
93. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98.  
94. Kan. v. Colo., 185 U.S. 125, 146–47 (1902).  
95. See Vt. v. N.Y., 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (noting that the original jurisdiction 
extends to adjudications between States based on “principles of law, some drawn from the 
international field, some expressing a ‘common law’ formulated over the decades”); see 
also Neb. v. Wyo., 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colo. v. Kan., 320 U.S. at 393–94. 
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law rule to govern an interstate dispute.96 In so doing, the Court 
has cautioned that state law is “not to be deemed to have 
controlling weight”97—a rule that prevents the inequitable result 
of choosing one state’s laws over another’s.98 As the Court 
explained in Connecticut v. Massachusetts:
[T]his is not to say that there must be an equal division of 
the waters of an interstate stream among the States through 
which it flows. It means that the principles of right and 
equity shall be applied having regard to the “equal level or 
plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and 
right, under our constitutional system” and that, upon a 
consideration of the pertinent laws of the Contending 
states . . . this Court will determine what is an equitable 
apportionment of the use of such waters.99
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court declined to rely on either 
of the States’ competing bodies of water law, and instead simply 
weighed the relevant factors in a manner designed to “establis[h] 
justice” between the States.100 In other interstate water disputes, 
the Court has affirmatively adopted state law as the federal 
common law rule for the case—most notably where both States 
employ the same state-law methodology for apportioning water, 
such as the Western water law principle of prior 
appropriation.101 The Court also looks to state law where state 
law rights may be considered as part of the equitable 
apportionment analysis.102 Under these precedents, the Court’s 
creation of federal common law is not entirely unbounded, but 
takes into account the delicate task of ensuring that each State is 
treated with equal dignity before the Court. 
96. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107 (noting that state standards may be 
relevant despite the existence of federal common law on nuisance).
97. Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931). 
98. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98 (recognizing equal status of States).  
99. Conn. v. Mass. 282 U.S. at 670–71 (citation omitted). 
100. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98.  
101. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1922), the Court applied the 
doctrine of prior appropriation because both States adhered to that doctrine as a means of 
establishing priorities over waters within their boundaries. See also Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. 
at 183–84 (discussing “equable apportionment” and “prior appropriation”); Neb. v. Wyo.,
325 U.S. at 617–18, 622 (discussing “priority of appropriation” and recognizing it as a 
“guiding principle for an apportionment” when both States follow the doctrine).  
102. See, e.g., Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 670–71. 
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V. PROCEDURES FOR INTERSTATE DISPUTES WITHIN THE 
COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
The same historical and structural concerns that animate the 
substance of the Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence also 
influence the procedures that the Court follows in such cases—
procedures that differ significantly from those governing its 
appellate docket. 
A. Intervention by Non-State Parties 
Although the Court certainly could have justified a rule that 
only sovereign States could be parties to original jurisdiction 
actions brought under the head of Article III, Section 2, for 
“controversies between two or more states,” the Court long has 
allowed non-State persons or entities to be named as parties to 
such actions, in part based on the further provision in Section 2 
for suits “between a State and Citizens of another State,” as well 
as the general provision for original jurisdiction over cases “in 
which a state shall be a party.”103 The practice of allowing such 
parties began in 1792 with the Court’s decision in Georgia v. 
Brailsford,104 and “for more than two centuries the Court has 
exercised that jurisdiction over nonstate parties in suits between 
two or more States.”105 Such actions have involved a wide range 
of subjects, including claims for equitable apportionment of 
water.106
Consistent with this history, the Court also has permitted 
non-State parties to intervene in original jurisdiction actions 
under appropriate circumstances.107 The Court’s criteria for 
103. See generally S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266 (discussing rules developed in earlier 
cases).
104. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). 
105. S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266 (citing N.Y. v. Conn., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799), and 
Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. at 224–25)). 
106. Id. (citing Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 608, n.1 (1983); Tex. v. N.M., 343 U.S. 932; 
N.J. v. City of N.Y., 279 U.S. 823 (1929) (per curiam) (granting motion to add City)). 
107. Id. at 265 (citing Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 745, n.21); see also, e.g., Okla. v. Tex., 
258 U.S. 574, 581, 598 (1922) (involving boundary dispute threatening armed hostilities 
with respect to private intervenors’ rights in contested land); Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 745 
n.21 (permitting private corporations to intervene in original-action Commerce Clause 
challenge to State’s imposition of allegedly unlawful tax). 
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permitting such intervention have rested heavily on the original 
constitutional and historical rationale for original jurisdiction 
over controversies between two or more States. Generally, the 
Court has narrowly restricted the scope of intervention for non-
state parties in interstate disputes, applying the parens patriae
doctrine to hold that, because a State is deemed to represent the 
interests of its citizens, there is no need for such non-State 
parties to intervene to protect their own rights.108 When a private 
party seeks to intervene in a case in which the intervenor’s home 
State is already a party, the intervenor must demonstrate the 
necessity for its inclusion and that the State will not adequately 
represent its interests: that is, the intervenor must show “some 
compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a 
class with all other citizens and creatures of the same state, 
which interest is not properly represented by the state.”109
In Oklahoma v. Texas, the Court first addressed the issue of 
whether non-State party plaintiffs could intervene in interstate 
disputes. In that case, the United States had intervened to assert 
claims against the party States over a contested river, and the 
Court appointed a receiver to take possession of certain disputed 
property.110 Various parties then sought to intervene, claiming 
rights in the land that the receiver controlled.111 Finding these 
claims in conflict with one another and “with the claims of one 
or more of the three principal litigants,”112 the Court allowed the 
intervention, which it concluded “would permit all possible 
claims to the property . . . to be freely and appropriately 
asserted” such that no other court could govern the receiver’s 
control.113
In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court allowed several 
pipeline companies to intervene in an interstate case that 
addressed the constitutionality of Louisiana’s natural gas tax.114
The Court found that the pipeline companies had a “direct stake 
108. Patashnik, supra note 91, at 43.  
109. N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (denying Philadelphia’s motion to 
intervene, on the ground that the city failed to meet its burden to show that Pennsylvania 
did not represent its interests); accord S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266–67. 
110. Okla. v. Tex., 258 U.S. at 579.
111. Id. at 581.  
112. Id.
113. Id. at 580 (discussing receiver’s appointment).  
114. Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 729. 
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in th[e] controversy” and concluded that, “in the interest of a full 
exposition of the issues,” it would accept the Special Master’s 
recommendation that they be allowed to intervene.115 Although 
the private parties’ injuries were identical to that of the State, the 
Court did not find that this alignment of interests precluded 
intervention.116 And in Arizona v. California, where Native 
American tribes sought leave to intervene, the Court found that 
the tribes were “entitled to take their place as independent 
qualified members of the modern body politic,”117 despite the 
State’s claim that the intervention—insofar as it would permit 
claims by the tribes against the States—would compromise the 
State’s sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh 
Amendment and not waived as part of the original Article III 
provision for resolving disputes between the States 
themselves.118
In some other original jurisdiction cases, the Court has 
found that the putative intervenors lacked the requisite 
independent interest.119 In New Jersey v. New York, the Court 
denied a motion by the city of Philadelphia to intervene in a 
dispute in which New Jersey challenged a diversion by New 
York of the waters of the Delaware River, holding that the City 
had not met its burden to show that Pennsylvania would not 
adequately represent its interest and that it had a “compelling 
interest” in its own right.120 The Court explained that it would be 
unworkable to permit each municipality that might have an 
interest in the matter to become a party: “If we undertook to 
evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we could, 
in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the 
distribution of water within the Commonwealth.”121
In South Carolina v. North Carolina—in which South 
Carolina sought an equitable apportionment of the waters of the 
Catawba River—the Court denied leave for the City of Charlotte 
115. Id. at 745 n.21.
116. Id. at 743–45 (discussing tax burden felt by people of states outside Louisiana and 
concluding that the case was an “appropriate one for the exercise of our original 
jurisdiction under § 1251(b)(2)”).
117. Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1983) (discussing tribes’ interest).  
118. Id. at 615.  
119. See, e.g., Tex. v. N.J., 379 U.S. 674, 677, 683 (1965); N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. at 373.  
120. N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. at 373. 
121. Id.
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A      11/15/2017   09:50:50
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A      11/15/2017   09:50:50
LINSLEYRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2017 6:08 PM 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION—CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 45
to intervene as a defendant, but permitted two other parties to do 
so.122 As a municipality of North Carolina and a beneficiary of 
its alleged water use, Charlotte was adequately represented by 
North Carolina,123 which shared Charlotte’s interest in ensuring 
that the city received water.124 By contrast, the Court allowed 
intervention by Duke Energy, which had eleven power plants 
along the river, with accompanying dams, on both sides of the 
state boundary and necessarily would be involved in any 
resulting allocation plan.125 The Court also allowed intervention 
by a bi-state municipal entity that also had operations on both 
sides of the state boundary.126 The Court found that these parties 
had strong interests in the outcome of the dispute that were not 
aligned with those of either of the two party States.127
B. Requirement to Seek Leave 
The existence of a dispute between States does not 
automatically warrant the exercise of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. The complaining State must seek leave from the 
Court to file a bill of complaint, and in so doing must meet 
certain threshold requirements. Before filing an initial pleading, 
a complaining State invokes the Court’s original jurisdiction by 
making a motion for leave to file in the Court.128 For the case to 
commence, the motion must be approved by a majority of the 
Justices. When deciding whether to grant the motion for leave to 
122. S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 267–74 (discussing potential intervenors’ individual 
situations).
123. Id. at 274 (“Charlotte is a municipality of North Carolina, and for purposes of this 
litigation, its transfers of water from the Catawba River basin constitute part of North 
Carolina’s equitable share. . . . Charlotte, therefore, occupies a class of affected North 
Carolina users of water, and the magnitude of Charlotte’s authorized transfer does not 
distinguish it in kind from other members of the class.” (citations omitted)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 268–73. 
126. Id.
127. Id. at 271, 273 (holding that “neither State [had] sufficient interest . . . to represent 
the full scope of the [municipal entity’s] interests,” and that the “importance” and 
“relevance” of Duke Energy’s interests indicated that they “should be represented by a 
party,” but that “neither State [was] situated to do so properly”). 
128. SUP. CT. R. 17(3) (providing that “[t]he initial pleading [in an action invoking the 
Court’s original jurisdiction] shall be preceded by a motion for leave to file, and may be 
accompanied by a brief in support of the motion”).  
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file, the Court considers several important requirements, which 
largely follow from the “grave and delicate” nature of the 
jurisdiction and the corresponding need to exercise it 
sparingly.129
First, the complaining State must establish standing to 
bring the action against the defendant State or States. It does so 
by showing “a direct interest of its own” and “not merely 
seeking recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real 
parties in interest.”130 As Maryland v. Louisiana demonstrates, 
for example, the State “may act as the representative of its 
citizens in original actions” when the injury “affects the general 
population of a State in substantial way.”131 In that case, the 
Court held that the plaintiff States could sue for the injury to 
their citizens’ property interests as a result of an alleged 
unconstitutional tax imposition.132 The Court reasoned that the 
States had a broad interest “in protecting [their] citizens from 
substantial economic injury” because the citizens could not 
bring suit in Louisiana.133 Although the need to establish 
standing may preclude some types of interstate claims, the Court 
has recognized standing for interstate disputes over boundaries, 
pollution, tax, and—as this article itself demonstrates—water 
allocation.134
Second, the Court imposes a heightened pleading standard 
that must be met before it “exercise[s] its extraordinary power 
under the Constitution to control the conduct of one [sovereign] 
129. See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76–77. 
130. Kan. v. Colo., 533 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (indicating that injury to Kansas as a State 
gave it standing to bring an action against Colorado for water disputes rooted in the 
Arkansas River Compact).
131. Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 737 (citations omitted).  
132. Id. at 739.
133. Id. (pointing out that “individual consumers cannot be expected to litigate . . . 
given that the amounts paid by each consumer are likely to be relatively small”).
134. See, e.g., Mont. v. Wyo., 563 U.S. 368, 375 (2011) (involving dispute over 
appropriation of water under a compact); Ala. v. N.C., 560 U.S. 330, 338 (2010) (involving 
dispute over a compact addressing storage of low-level radioactive waste); Wyo. v. Okla.,
502 U.S. at 452 (involving effects on Wyoming coal-severance-tax receipts of Oklahoma 
statute requiring power plants located in Oklahoma to burn a specific percentage of coal 
mined in Oklahoma); Ohio v. Ky., 410 U.S. 641, 652 (1973) (involving boundary dispute 
over the Ohio River). 
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state at the suit of another.”135 This standard creates a much 
higher burden for the complaining State than would apply in a 
private suit between individuals.136 Among other things, the 
Court will not grant leave unless “the threatened injury is clearly 
shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent.”137
Third, even if the complaining State meets these minimum 
prerequisites, the Court still may refuse to entertain the action. 
As noted above, the Court has refused to exercise its original 
jurisdiction even in cases within its exclusive, original 
jurisdiction, where the requisite “seriousness and dignity of the 
claim” was lacking.138 In addition, because of the Court’s 
limited resources, the Court considers whether the issue can 
appropriately be litigated in an alternative forum.139 The Court 
may choose to send the case to a district court, provided that it 
involves a federal question.140 Yet, even when the parties do not 
have access to another forum in which to litigate, the Court still 
may use its discretion on a case-by-case basis to deny leave to 
file an original action.141
135. N.D. v. Minn., 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (holding in an interstate water dispute 
that Minnesota’s construction of drainage ditches and straightening of a river channel  was 
not responsible for floods affecting North Dakota) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
136. See id.
137. Ala. v. Ariz., 291 U.S. 286, 292 (1934) (determining that the amended bill did not 
meet the requirements to grant leave).  
138. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93, 108 (declining to exercise original jurisdiction 
because the claim at issue lacked “seriousness and dignity,” and “remit[ting] the parties to 
an appropriate district court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 495 (concluding that although case 
falls within original jurisdiction, the Court “should nevertheless decline to exercise” 
original jurisdiction); Mass. v. Mo., 308 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1939) (declining to exercise 
original jurisdiction over a matter involving state taxes, finding that another proper and 
adequate remedy was available); Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The 
Supreme Court’s Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. 
REV. 185, 190 (1993) (noting that the Court rejected fifty State-party cases between 
October 1, 1961, and April 25, 1993, and provided only nine published opinions explaining 
its reasons for refusing to hear most of them).  
139. Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. at 797 (finding that state court action provided an 
“appropriate forum” in which to resolve the controversy).
140. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 (indicating that the “question of apportionment 
of interstate waters is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which state statutes or 
decisions are not conclusive”).
141. Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76 (recognizing that original jurisdiction is to be exercised 
only sparingly and with discretion); see also Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 495.
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C. High Barrier to a Decree Affecting Sovereign Interests 
Even if a State succeeds in invoking the Court’s original 
jurisdiction and establishing its case by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the complaining State is not necessarily assured a 
victory in the form of a decree. Based upon the same delicate 
sovereign interests that may cause the Court to decline to 
entertain an original jurisdiction action between States, the 
Court may decline to enter a decree in such an action, even 
where one State seemingly has proven its case. This is 
particularly true in equitable apportionment cases involving 
interstate waters, where the requested decree normally would 
take the form of an order enjoining the defendant State from 
certain uses or actions with respect to the disputed waters. The 
Court has stated that, at a minimum, the complaining State must 
establish “proof by clear and convincing evidence of some real 
and substantial injury or damage.”142 But even a showing of 
such injury may not be enough to warrant a decree from the 
Court. Rather, before the Court will exercise its extraordinary 
powers to enjoin a State’s actions, it must also be shown that the 
“countervailing equities” that benefit the defendant State do not 
“justify the detriment to existing users” in the complaining 
State.143 The complaining State must demonstrate, with “clear 
and convincing evidence,” a substantial injury caused by the 
other State, such as “unreasonably wasteful” use,144 such that the 
Court would be prepared to defend its decree “against all 
considerations on the other side.”145 And the defendant State 
may prove that the benefits of its uses or proposed uses of water 
“substantially outweigh the harm[s]” alleged by the complaining 
State, in which case no decree will issue.146
The Court’s decision in Kansas v. Colorado illustrates this 
point and also the degree to which the Court is reluctant to 
intervene in a way that will disrupt the balance of sovereign 
142. Neb. v. Wyo., 507 U.S. 584, 591 (1993); see also Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187 
n.13 (discussing burden of proof); Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 669; N.Y. v. N.J., 256 U.S. 
296, 309 (1921).  
143. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187. 
144. Id. at 189–90 (remanding for further findings).  
145. Mo. v. Ill., 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (using this characterization in a case in which 
the bill was dismissed after trial because Missouri failed to meet the standard of proof).  
146. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187. 
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interests between States. As discussed above, this case resulted 
in the first expression of the Court’s doctrine of equitable 
apportionment with respect to interstate waters.147 After a trial, 
the Court agreed with Kansas that the “diminution of the flow of 
water in the river by the irrigation of Colorado has worked some 
detriment to the southwestern part of Kansas.”148 Nonetheless, 
the Court found that comparing the amount of detriment to 
Kansas with the “great benefit” to Colorado led to the 
conclusion that “equality of right and equity between the two 
states forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of 
water in Colorado for the purposes of irrigation.”149 The Court 
made much the same point in its later decision in Colorado v. 
Kansas:
[I]n such disputes as this, the court is conscious of the great 
and serious caution with which it is necessary to approach 
the inquiry whether a case is proved. Not every matter 
which would warrant resort to equity by one citizen against 
another would justify our interference with the action of a 
state, for the burden on the complaining state is much 
greater than that generally required to be borne by private 
parties. Before the court will intervene the case must be of 
serious magnitude and fully and clearly proved. And in 
determining whether one state is using, or threatening to 
use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a 
stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of one 
state or the other must be weighed as of the date when the 
controversy is mooted.150
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, the Court again displayed 
a reluctance to disrupt the status quo between two sovereign 
States by issuing a coercive decree. Connecticut had challenged 
a plan by Massachusetts to divert waters of the Connecticut 
River, claiming that the diversion plan inevitably would harm 
Connecticut’s agriculture and hydropower capabilities.151 After 
taking jurisdiction and holding a full trial on the merits—and 
also making findings that agreed with many of the assertions 
147. See text accompanying notes 85–89, supra.
148. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 113–14.  
149. Id. at 114. 
150. Colo. v. Kan.,  320 U.S. at 393–94 (footnote omitted).
151. Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 663–67 (setting out facts alleged by Connecticut and 
findings of special master).
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Connecticut had made—the Court ultimately dismissed the bill 
of complaint because Connecticut had not offered “clear and 
convincing” evidence of serious injury so as to provide the 
Court a warrant to “exert its extraordinary power to control the 
conduct of one State at the suit of another.”152
Similar factors affected the outcome in Missouri v. Illinois.
Although the Court granted leave to file the action—thereby 
establishing the principle that a State may bring an original 
action in a parens patriae capacity153—the Court ultimately 
found that Missouri had failed to meet the high bar for the 
Court’s original jurisdiction. Missouri had complained of the 
alleged discharge of Chicago sewage that sent “poisonous filth 
daily into the Mississippi,”154 but the Court found that the river 
experienced “no visible increase of filth” and “no new smell,” 
further noting the unlikelihood that the Court would have found 
this “a nuisance of the simple kind” known to the “older 
common law.”155 The Court also considered whether the alleged 
contamination appeared to have any effect on year-over-year 
statistics tracking the number of typhoid-fever cases in St. Louis 
and independent research into the ability of the bacteria to travel 
through the river.156 Because the factual findings introduced by 
the two States made “the case weaker in principle as well as 
harder to prove,” the Court ultimately dismissed the bill.157
V. THE COURT’S RELIANCE ON SPECIAL MASTERS
Because the Court has limited resources that are not well 
suited to the day-to-day activities of a trial court, it typically 
delegates the initial management of an original jurisdiction case, 
as well as the development of the factual record and initial 
findings of fact and law. In early original jurisdiction cases, the 
Court sometimes appointed a commissioner to assist with these 
152. Id. at 666–67, 669; see also Colo. v. N.M., 467 U.S. 310, 319, 320 (1984) 
(determining that Colorado failed to meet its burden of demonstrating injury by providing 
only “generalizations” and “mere assertions”).  
153. See text accompanying notes 65–67, supra.
154. Mo. v. Ill., 200 U.S. at 517.
155. Id. at 522.  
156. Id. at 523–25.  
157. Id. at 526.  
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duties,158 including by taking testimony from witnesses.159 In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court appointed 
commissioners to assume the task of enforcing judicial decrees, 
specifically those involving state boundaries.160
Over the years, the Court expanded its use of third parties 
to assist in managing original cases. In 1908, the Court created 
the office of the Special Master, through which the Court could 
designate individual Special Masters for specific cases to assist 
its decisionmaking by making initial factual findings and legal 
conclusions.161 Since then, the scope of the authority wielded by 
Special Masters has expanded to include hearing evidence, 
developing the case record, and issuing a report to the Court.162
In so doing, a Special Master often interprets compacts and 
other relevant documents and precedents, and makes 
recommendations as to any appropriate disposition or relief.163
The Special Master also is authorized to “fix the time and 
conditions” for the filing of pleadings, to direct proceedings and 
summon witnesses, and to issue subpoenas,164 and to entertain 
motions and preside over trials.165 In some cases, a Special 
Master may take years to prepare a case for review by the Court, 
amassing a substantial and lengthy record, including expert 
testimony on technical or scientific matters.166 In the seminal 
original jurisdiction case of Arizona v. California, the litigation 
lasted for decades and the trial lasted for two years.167
158. See, e.g., Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. 401, 401 (1791) (appointing 
commissioners in the first original jurisdiction case filed in the Supreme Court). 
159. See id. (indicating that the commissioners were to “examine witnesses in 
Holland”).
160. See Carstens, supra note 29, at 643.  
161. See Va. v. W. Va., 209 U.S. 514, 534–37 (1908) (ordering that case be referred to 
a Special Master to report factual findings to the Court).  
162. See, e.g., Vt. v. N.H., 282 U.S. 796, 796 (1930).  
163. See e.g., Okla. v. N.M., 501 U.S. 221, 221 (1991) (remanding to Master for further 
proceedings to be followed by recommendations on the merits).  
164. See e.g., Neb. v. Iowa, 379 U.S. 996, 996 (1965) (describing authority given to the 
Special Master and allowing him to recover expenses).
165. See, e.g., Ariz. v. Cal., 466 U.S. 144, 144 (1984) (approving Special Master’s 
recommendation that additional parties be permitted to intervene).  
166. See, e.g., N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. 597, 608 (2008) (observing that the Special Master 
“carefully considered nearly 6,500 pages of materials presented by the parties”).  
167. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963) (noting that, in the course of the two-year 
trial, “340 witnesses were heard orally or by deposition, thousands of exhibits were 
received, and 25,000 pages of transcript were filled”); see also Ariz. v. Cal., 531 U.S. 1 
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After collecting the evidence and examining the applicable 
law, the Special Master prepares and submits a report of 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Court for de 
novo review.168 Any party to the action may challenge the 
Special Master’s report by filing exceptions to all or part of the 
findings,169 a process that requires the parties to select their 
strongest available arguments.170 The Court may sustain or 
overrule the exceptions and either reject or adopt the Special 
Master’s report in whole or in part. The Court also may remand 
the case to the Special Master to take additional evidence.171
And although the Court has no obligation to defer to any aspect 
of the Special Master’s report, certainly there have been cases 
where the Court has appeared to do so.172
Some commentators have criticized aspects of the Court’s 
use of Special Masters, including the lack of transparency in the 
process by which Special Masters are appointed, the impropriety 
of deference to decisionmakers who are not subject to the 
Constitutional appointment process, and the absence of rules 
governing the manner in which Special Masters conduct 
(2000) (entering final supplemental decree filed after motion to re-open was granted in 
Ariz. v. Cal., 493 U.S. 866 (1989)). 
168. See, e.g., Vt. v. N.H., 282 U.S. at 796 (indicating that any “findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations of the special master shall be subject to consideration, revision, or 
approval by the Court”).  
169. See, e.g., U.S. v. La., 485 U.S. 88, 89 (1988) (overruling exceptions by the State of 
Mississippi that would have expanded the scope of the litigation); Stuart A. Raphael, 
Practical Considerations in Original Action Litigation: Virginia v. Maryland and New 
Jersey v. Delaware, 12 WYO. L. REV. 15, 22 (2012) (noting that, in light of word limits on 
exceptions, “a state that loses an argument before the Special Master may be forced to 
abandon it when choosing the best issues to raise on exceptions”); see also id. at 22–23 
(discussing consequences of issue choice and assessing outcome in an illustrative case). 
170. One group of commentators has observed that the standard appointment order for a 
Special Master authorizes “fairly extensive powers,” including broad discretion in 
“conduct[ing] the proceedings.” Jeffrey L. Bleich et al., Supreme Court Watch: Very 
Special Masters—Handling the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 35 S.F. 
ATT’Y 45, 47–48 (2009).  
171. See Okla. v. N.M., 501 U.S. at 221.  
172. In Virginia v. Maryland and New Jersey v. Delaware, for example, the Court 
appointed the same Special Master. See N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. at 617 (referring to Special 
Master Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr.); Va. v. Md., 540 U.S. 56, 64 (2003) (same). The Special 
Master analyzed and reconciled the differences in the two cases in his recommendations, 
which the Court found persuasive, noting that “both original actions were referred to” Mr. 
Lancaster in his capacity as Special Master. N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. at 617. 
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proceedings.173 But in the end it is the Court that ultimately 
determines the facts and law in any original jurisdiction case, 
and the Court certainly is free to develop its own procedures for 
developing the record that will allow it to make those 
determinations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although original jurisdiction cases rarely generate the 
kind of national press that attends other categories of cases, the 
Court’s role in resolving controversies between States remains a 
vital feature of our constitutional government. Having given up 
aspects of their sovereignty to become part of a federalist 
government, the States need a means of resolving their disputes 
in an evenhanded way that respects the residual sovereignty of 
each State. The Court’s jurisprudence in original cases under 
Article III has consistently reflected that fundamental purpose. 
173. See, e.g., Carstens, supra note 29, at 668–69 (characterizing involvement of 
Special Masters in original jurisdiction cases as “disquieting,” decrying their acting in “the 
absence of either delineated rules or a vast body of precedent,” and expressing concern that 
the use of Special Masters can lead to “outcomes that result from processes not in 
conformity with the public’s notion of fair adjudication”).
